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Ill

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78.A-4-103(2)6)- This appeal is
taken from the Warrant and Order of Commitment filed September 21, 2015 (the "Judgment''),
by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. See, Addendum "A."
This appeal includes interlocutory orders entered September 10, 2015, during the contempt
hearing respecting Erica Linker ("Erica"), to wit Order to &lease Funds, releasing the
remaining trust balance to Mr. Peterman for fees/costs; Order, allowing access to Erica's
personal storage unit containing items from the estate; and Civil Bench Warrant, ordering
Erica's arrest and setting her bond at $210,000.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF
REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court appropriate!J determine Erica was in wil!ful violation

of district

court orders when its orders were either predicated upon erroneous determinations or
ful!J complied with?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: Dansie v. Dansie states that, "[a]n order relating to
contempt of court is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . 'In
the absence of any action [by the trial court] which is so unreasonable as to be classified as
capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of ... discretion,' we will not overturn the trial
court's order." Ibid., 1999 UT App. 92, ,i 6, 977 P.2d 539 (internal citations omitted).

PRESERVATION: Erica filed a written objection to Peter Linker's ("Peter'') OSC.
R00473-00474. Counsel for Erica appeared and opposed the OSC, objecting to entry of any

finding of contempt. R01010.
ISSUE II:

Did the distri,t court proper!J award attornf!Y fees in the amount of $11,000 from
the Chase Bank Trust account in Erica~ name far Peter's cummt and ongoing legal
fees and costs, including the future cost to hire an expert witness, doing so without

notice to Erica and lacking in evidentiary support, particular!J since there was no
finding of badfaith on Erica spart?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Generally the grant or denial of attorney fees is left to the
district court's sound discretion. However, to the extent that the [court's ruling] depends
upon an interpretation of the applicable statute, the district court's determination about what
the law requires is reviewed for correctness." JP Mor;gan Chase Bank, NA v. Wright, 2015 UT
App. 301, ,i 15, 365 P.3d 708 (citations omitted).

PRESERVATION: This issue is not required to be preserved. See, State in Interest of
D.B., 2012 UT 65, ,i 34, 289 P.3d 459 (''The general preservation rule 'does not apply,
however, when the alleged error first arises in the lower court's final order or judgment and
thus, leaves no opportunity for the party to object below or to bring issues to the attention
of the trial court."'(citations omitted)).

ISSUE III:

Did the tnal court violate Eni:a 's right to Due Process by failing to afford her the
necessary time to ob/ed and personal!J appear at hean·ng, to confront witnesses
against her, and otherwise present evidence in her defense before the finding of
1,Timinal contempt entered against her?

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW: "Constitutional issues are questions of
law that we review for correctness." State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App. 206, ,I 6, 189 P.3d 69
(citations omitted).

PRESERVATION: Erica's counsel appeared on September 10, 2015, and argued
Erica had not been served with the OSC, depriving her of sufficient notice to
prepare/present a defense. R01010. The district court moved forward on the OSC, R01009,
although the court believed the hearing had been set (but also not noticed) for temporary
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orders, R01015, depriving Erica of the ability to appear in the OSC proceedings and/or
prepare her defense thereto and violating Erica's right to Due Process.

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Pursuant to UT. R . .APP. P. 24(a)(6), the controlling constitutional provisions, statutes
and rules are set out verhatiin in the arguments below and attached as Attaclunent ''B."

STATEI\IBNT OF THE CASE
Peter and Erica Linker are the surviving children of Alfred and Gwendolyn Linker

(respectively, "Alfred" and "Gwendolyn") . .Alfred died in November of 2005 and
Gwendolyn died in October of 2013. This case centers upon the estate documents created
and executed by Gwendolyn.
Before her death, Gwendolyn executed estate documents creating The Gwendolyn
Linker Trust .Agreement (the "Trust,;. R00149-00160. There were three (3) amendments to
the Trust, the last of which (hereinafter, the "Third Amendment'') appointed Erica as the
personal representative of the Trust upon Gwendolyn's death. R00168-00171. The Third
. Amendment gave specific instructions regarding calculation of Peter and Erica's inheritances
and provided compensation to Erica as trustee and an employee:
The trustee shall also calculate all advancements made to her children
individually including interest accrued or applicable. Upon final calculation of
the total trust estate, the Trustee shall divide the trust estate so that each
child's share is equal taking into account all of the advancements. Upon such
division the Trustee shall distribute to each child his or her share outright and
free of trust ... Peter has received male jewelry and camera equipment, Erica
has received female jewelry, and the Van as gifts before my death. These will
be considered equal bequests. At this time, Peter S. Linker has received
$210,000.00 (taxes paid) more than Erica has received, as advancement in
cash. If any further amounts are discovered or given, this number may be
adjusted by the Trustee.

3 of 48

R00169. Gwendolyn's estate documents specifically forbade Peter from being trustee due to
his prior misconduct associated with Alfred's estate. Id.
Gwendolyn executed instructions and statements

in

2013 (collectively, the

"Instructions") which directed the trustee pay $50,000 to Erica from the Merrill Lynch
account to match an amount Peter already received after Alfred's death. R00284. The
remaining $40,000 from that account was directed to be used for Erica's personal expenses.

Id. Further, "[e]xpenses for Erica and Tim will be paid for by the Trust, plus medical and
dental bills and Vet care for the dogs until the house is sold and my affairs are dealt with."
Id. The Instructions authorized compensation for Erica and Tim for their full-time, 24-hour

care of Gwendolyn, plus six-months' severance and two (2) weeks paid vacation per year
that Erica was unable to take, in addition to Erica's position as trustee. Id. Erica later testified
she and Tim cared for Gwendolyn around the clock for approximately one (1) year. See,
R00931.
Gwendolyn explicitly stated that Peter did not have her permission to act as the agent
under the Power of Attorney other than to sign taxes and transfer her stocks into the Merrill
Lynch account, because Peter had effectuated unauthorized use of Gwendolyn's credit,
made unauthorized changes in designations on insurance or stocks, made unauthorized
transfers of funds from Gwendolyn's accounts, taken out unauthorized loans in
Gwendolyn's name, sold her property or vehicles without authorization, and "take[n] stocks,
bonds, or any other assets of mine or my husbands' estates." R00286. Gwendolyn forbid
Peter from taking out loans, selling property or vehicles, or taking stocks, bonds, or running
up margins in stock accounts, or controlling any other assets belonging to Gwendolyn and
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her husband. Id. 1bis statement specifically dictates, "[m]y daughter [Erica] does not have to
prove in a court of law how much money my son [Peter] received. I trust her to be fair and
determine this without any interference from any State or Federal Government entity." Id.
(emphasis added). Gwendolyn executed a Nomination of Guardian 'by an Adult, appointing
Erica as her guardian in the event of Gwendolyn's incapacitation. R00287.

In 2014, Peter filed suit attempting to probate Gwendolyn's outdated will appointing
him as personal representative of her estate; however, this contradicted the Third
.Amendment and Gwendolyn's Instructions. See, Utah District Court Case No. 143901031.
On April 6, 2015, Peter filed the Complaint alleging Erica and had abused her position
of fiduciary duty by living on funds from the Trust. R00001-00019. Peter alleged entitlement
to his inheritance and demanded distribution, requesting an accounting of the estate and that
Erica be removed as trustee under injunctive relief. R00005.
Erica filed an Answer on April 26, 015, R00052-00068, and subsequent counter-claim
(the "Counter-Claim") on May 26, 2015, R00094-00116, denying Peter's allegations and
alleging Peter had stolen funds from their parents, but called the unauthorized actions
"advancements" to his inheritance. R00095-00101. Erica alleged duress, conversion,
interference with inheritance, unjust enrichment, reformation, and requested an accounting
from Peter as the trustee of Alfred's estate. R00115.
On June 16, 2015, Peter moved for an injunction against Erica arguing elements of

UT. R. CIV. P. 65.A.. R00133-00136. A temporary restraining order entered June 17, 2015, (the
"June 17 TRO''). R00222-00225. The June 17 TRO restrained Erica from selling,
dissipating, encumbering, disposing of, or taking any other action that adversely affects the
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value of any Trust asset, ordering Erica to provide an accounting from July 16, 2012, to
present, and ordered her to return or disgorge (1) all funds removed from any financial
account Gwendolyn or the Trust had an interest in as of October 31, 2013 (i.e. retroactively
for almost two years); (2) the proceeds of the sale of the residence; (3) all personal property
removed from the property, and (4) any other funds that are the result of the sale or
disposition of any Trust assets, which should be returned to an account located at American
United Credit Union. Id. Although Gwendolyn's estate documents specifically indicated that
Erica had full trustee power and forbade state or governmental interference with her
decisions, including providing proof to a court to support those decisions, the court's June
17 TRO sought to undo all of Erica's decisions as trustee under temporary orders requested
by Peter. Gwendolyn herself (in written documentation prior to her death) recognized Peter
had extorted funds from both parents' accounts and maintained substantial offsets that likely
would cancel out any inheritance from the Trust. Nonetheless, the June 17 TRO went
retroactive for two (2) years to Gwendolyn's death, in contradiction to her own articulated
desires for her estate.
Opposing the June 17 TRO, Erica argued the case did not meet the elements of Rule
65A, requesting injunction against Peter. R00228-00245;00238-00240. Erica requested that
Peter be restrained from coming within a mile of her person and property and that he not
disturb any of her personal funds or the Trust funds. R00243-00244. Erica attached
Gwendolyn's pertinent estate documents and Instructions in support. R00248-00305.
The June 17 TRO was heard June 25, 2015. R00306-00307. As articulated more
particularly below, the trial court orally usurped the June 17 TRO and indicated it was not
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~I

entering orders seizing Erica's personal accounts or anything Gwendolyn transferred to
Erica prior to her death. Erica as trustee had previously paid herself for her care of
Gwendolyn, her role as trustee, the amount she was entitled to from the Meryl Lynch
account, and her inheritance after dividing the remaining Trust funds between her and Peter

(subtracting $210,000 from Peter's inheritance according to Gwendolyn's stated desire). At
the time of this hearing, the money was Erica's personal funds and located in her personal
accounts, which also contained Erica's funds from the sale of her own condo, her
employment, and other sources.
On June 26, 2015, to clarify any confusion in the district court's oral ruling as to
which accounts Erica could access, Erica filed her Verified Clarification, clarifying the two (2)
accounts at Chase Bank--one personal and one Trust. R00308-00311. Erica indicated the
court's oral order was that the injunction only affected the Trust accounts with Trust assets,
not Erica's personal accounts. R00310-00311. Because the trial court did not intend to seize
or freeze Erica's personal accounts, Erica indicated she withdrew funds from her personal
account at Chase Bank, but did not touch the funds remaining in the Trust account. Id. Erica
provided the Trust account number ended in -0335, stating she had not made any
withdrawals from it since the oral decision. Id.
On July 6, 2015, Peter filed the proposed preliminary injunction with a notice to
submit. R00336-00339. On July 7, 2015, the district court entered the Preliminary Injunction
(the "Preliminary Injunction"), expanding its oral decision by freezing all Wells Fargo

''bank accounts titled jointly or solely in the name of Erica J. Linker and/ or the Gwendolyn
Linker Trust and/ or any accounts on which Erica J. Linker is a signer or authorized user" as
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well as the Chase Bank "accounts titled jointly or solely in the name of Erica J. Linker
and/ or the Gwendolyn Linker Trust and/ or any accounts on which Erica

J.

Linker is a

signer or authorized user". R00363-00366. The Preliminary Injunction further froze the
storage units located at U-haul and A-1 and ordered Erica to provide a full accounting of the
Trust to Peter by August 30, 2015. R00364.
On September 2, 2015, Peter filed his Ex Parle Motion and Memorandum far Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary /'!/unction (''Ex Parte Motion"), arguing Erica violated the
Preliminary Injunction by transferring $491,000 to her Mountain America Credit Union

("MACO'') account from her personal Chase account prior to entry of the Preliminary
Injunction, although it was unaffected by the oral decision. R00428-00435. Peter relied on
grounds raised at the June 25, 2015 hearing by reference. R00429. Peter provided statements
from Erica's Chase Bank accounts. R00431-00435. However, these accounts referenced by
Peter ended in -5520 and -6292 and were personally titled in Erica's name, not the Trust. Id.
On September 2, 2015, the Ex Parle Temporary Restraining Order entered, freezing
$471,237.62 in Erica's personal MACU account and ordering MACU to immediately advise

Mr. Peterman (Peter's attorney) as to the status of these wired funds. R00439-00440. The
court froze all of Erica's personal assets from other sources, such as the sale of her own
condo and funds received prior to Gwendolyn's death.
Gwendolyn's Instructions state that Peter is entitled to only halfof any post-mortem
Trust funds, with offsets totaling a minimum of $210,000 by Gwendolyn's own
determination and stated written desires. Even if the entire $471,237.62 was Trust funds,
which it was not, Peter would only be entitled to a maximum amount of $25,618.81 of the
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$471,237.62 that was frozen under simple calculation from Gwendolyn's executed
docwnents (half minus $210,000). Nonetheless, the entire amount was frozen.
The same day, the district court entered an additional Ex Parle Temporary Restrai.ning
Order (collectively, the ''Ex Parte TROs"), ordering any community bank accounts in

Erica's name, jointly or solely, and/ or any accounts under the Trust, to be frozen. R0045000451. The wired funds in the amount of $471,237.62 were also frozen in "any Community

Bank accounts to which the funds were initially wired on June 26, 2015". R00451.
"Community Bank" was also ordered to immediately advise Mr. Peterman as to the status of
these wired funds and their location, if possible. Id. The Ex Parte TR.Os remain blank as to
any hearing date or time.

See, R00439-00440; 00450-00451.

Relying on the Ex Parte TRO's, Community Bank in Oregon filed an interpleader
action naming Erica and Peter as the defendants and depositing $262,199.33 into the Circuit
Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Baker from Erica's bank account(s) at that
bank (the "Oregon Case''). R00500-00502. This amount represented all contents of Erica's
bank accounts deposited with the Oregon court, including Erica's personal employment
1ncome.
On September 8, 2015, the court clerk filed the Notice of Order to Show Cause, although
no OSC had been issued. 1 R00456. Directly after, Peter filed his Verified Motion far Order to

Show Cause (the "OSC Motion''), alleging Erica was in violation of the Preliminary
Injunction by withdrawing $491,000 from her personal Chase Bank account before the

1

This hearing was intended to be a hearing on the Ex Parte TRO's. The Minutes for this
hearing indicates in the caption it is minutes for a temporary restraining order hearing.
R00492. Further, the district court indicated this was the case at hearing. R01009-01010.
9 of48

written injunction entered. R00460-00461. Peter alleged Erica had transferred $471,237.62 to
her personal MACU account, then to her personal account at Community Bank in
Pendleton, Oregon. R00461. Peter requested Erica be found in contempt of the Preliminary
Injunction, seeking an indeterminate amount of attorneys' fees for the filing of the OSC
Motion, as well as Erica's incarceration to compel her locate and redeposit the funds back
into the Chase account(s). R00461-00462.
On September 9, 2015, at 3:54 p.m., the district court entered the Order to Show Cause
(the "OSC"), which directed Erica to appear and show cause the very next day on
September 10, 2015, at 3:00 p.m .. R00468-00469. Erica resided in Oregon. The OSC states,
"[y]ou must attend. If you do not attend, you might be held in contempt for court and the
relief requested might be granted. You have the right to be represented by a lawyer."
R00469. Further, "[b]ring with you any evidence that you want the court to consider and be
prepared to argue your position to the Court." Id.
Erica's attorney received the OSC Motion and OSC via the electronic filing system
and filed an Objection the morning of the hearing on September 10, 2015, noting Erica had
not been served and requesting a continuance to prepare her defense (the "Objection'').
R00473-00474. The district court instead entered several orders, to wit: Order, authorizing
Peter's inspection of storage units at A-1 Access and U-Haul and preventing Erica from
accessing the units after the inspection although they contained her personal property
(R0488-00489); a Bench Waffant and a subsequent Waffant and Order of Commitment (filed
September 21 ), ordering Erica's arrest with bail set at $210,000.00 and requiring her personal
appearance on November 5, 2015 (R00490-00491;R00524-00525); and the Order to Release
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Funds, ordering Chase Bank-absent any presentation of accounting of such fees/ costs-to
release $11,000.00 directly to Peter's attorney for Peter's legal fees based on Erica's lack of
personal appearance for the OSC and what the court found to be a waiver of her defense
(R00486-00487). Erica thereafter timely appealed. R00838-00839.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. June 25, 2015, TRO Hearing.
The parties appeared for hearing to argue the June 17th TR.O. R00SSS-01005. Peter's

attorney requested the hearing proceed by proffer and argument; however, Erica's counsel
indicated it was more properly evidentiary since the TRO should not issue at all. R0086400865. Erica was the only witness called.

Erica testified Gwendolyn died on October 31, 2013, and Erica was aware of the
Trust. R00872. Erica testified the assets at that time were the house and possibly other
assets, but legal issues with the assets required resolution. R00872-00873.
Gwendolyn had a Merrill Lynch account Gwendolyn closed before her death.
R00874-00875. Gwendolyn instructed Erica to take $50,000 for herself and put $40,000 into

an account for upkeep of the house, which Erica did. Id. All of these funds were initially put
in accounts in Erica's name because there was no trust account set up at that time; however,
the funds were in separate accounts to keep them separate. R00875-00876.
The house was sold three (3) weeks prior to the hearing for approximately $550,000
after fees. R00877. Erica understood that as the trustee she had an obligation to the Trust to
account for its assets. R00878. It was a cash sale that closed in under a week. Id. Within a
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month of listing the property at $750,000, the cash only offer of $550,000 came in and she
accepted it. R00883.
Erica testified she was the trustee, and Gwendolyn gave Erica the right to make
decisions regarding the Trust and to administer it. R00889-00890. Erica agreed the Third
Amendment contained a $210,000 offset to be charged against Peter's share of the estate and
the remainder would be split after consideration of advancements. R00891-00894.
Erica had not yet been formally appointed as the personal representative of
Gwendolyn's estate, although Gwendolyn's paperwork appointed her as such. R0090300904. Erica had been appointed as the trustee on July 16, 2012, and had not provided the
court or Peter with a formal accounting of the trust assets because Peter filed this case.
R00908-10.
The Merrill Lynch statement indicated the account was cashed out on October 31,
2013. R00920. In July of 2013, Gwendolyn authorized Erica to withdraw from the Merrill
Lynch account; however, Erica cashed the Merrill Lynch check after Gwendolyn died.
R00921-00922. Erica attempted to open a trust account during Gwendolyn's life; however,
Gwendolyn's driver's license had expired so they could not. R00923. Erica deposited the
Merrill Lynch account into two (2) separate personal accounts to keep them separate.
R00923-00924. Erica used her own funds on the Trust subject to reimbursement. Id.
The American United account was Gwendolyn's with Erica's name on it, and became
Erica's upon Gwendolyn's death. R00925. Funds were withdrawn after Gwendolyn's death.
R00928. Erica testified, " ... it got spent either for my use, as my mother intended, or for the
trust use, as my mother intended, to maintain the house." R00929. Erica spent a year-and-a-
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half dealing with the Trust, trying to sell the home, and paying for lawyers. R00930. Erica
spent $30,000 in attorneys' fees. Id. Erica could make a full accounting of what happened to
the $90,000 from the Merrill Lynch account. Id.
Erica quit her job as a neurological nurse at the Intermountain Medical Center in
2012 to care for Gwendolyn. R00931. She lived on her own savings and the proceeds from

the sale of her condo in January of 2015. R00931-00932. Erica paid her condo mortgage
with money received from Gwendolyn to pay her expenses. R00933.
Erica testified deposits into her personal account between January and June of 2015
were from payments owed from the Trust, which she transferred from the Trust account at
Wells Fargo. R00934. Erica had not paid payroll taxes because if an inheritance they will not
be taxed as wages. R00934-00935. Erica had not been paying herself monthly, but only took
what was needed. R00935.
Erica did not know the balance on the Wells Fargo account, but spent a large sum on
attorneys from it. R00936-00937. As trustee, Erica maintained the property, removed six (6)
dumpsters full of garbage from the home, and cared for Gwendolyn without assistance.
R0093 7. Erica kept a log of her hours worked. Id. Erica as trustee paid herself for the

previous hours she worked. R00938. Erica's boyfriend had done a large amount of work
maintaining Gwendolyn's yard for four (4) years and aiding Erica in caring for Gwendolynparticularly at night-and was paid $22,000. R00938-00939. Id. Erica did not know where
her boyfriend deposited the money. R00940.
Erica had personal and Trust accounts at Chase Bank, but did not know the exact
balances. R00940. There was more than $450,000 in those accounts. Id. Erica had a personal
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account at MACU. R00940-00941. The proceeds from the sale of her condo were in the
MA.CU account. R00941. She also had an account at America United Credit Union

("AUCU''). R00942. Erica spent $25,000 of her personal savings to live on while caring for
Gwendolyn. R00944.
Some personal property from the home was sold in an estate sale in June of 2014.
R009 51-009 52. The remaining property was located in a storage unit. R009 52. Erica felt
Peter was stalking her and felt unsafe providing the location of the storage unit, particularly
since he now knew the locations of funds in banks. Id. Erica maintained certain things Peter
indicated he wanted to later determine how to distribute them. Id Erica's personal storage
unit was located at U-haul on 33 rd South under her name. R00953-00954. The court assured
Erica that Peter would not access the storage unit with the property from the home. R00955.
Erica testified that storage unit was located at A-1 storage on 3300 South under her name. Id.
Erica intended to make a full accounting of the estate, including all advancements
taken by Peter and Erica. R00963-00964. Some of the advancements dated back to 1996.
R00964. Erica needed to separate what Gwendolyn spent as the trustee from what Erica
spent as successor trustee. R00965. A forensic accountant was needed due to Peter's
extortion to be charged against his inheritance. Id. Erica required money from the Trust to
fund these services, and could not accomplish this until the trust had liquid funds, which it
now had. Id Erica followed Gwendolyn's instructions to the best of her abilities. R00966.
The trial court inquired why Erica could not have paid for the accounting out of the
Merrill Lynch account ($90,000) and Erica explained Gwendolyn directed $50,000 for Erica
to live on and $40,000 to maintain the home. R00968. The $40,000 was used to pay the
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house taxes, the large water bill, and repairs until the home sold. Id. Regardless, Erica's
counsel argued the accounting was a trial issue. Id.
Erica would be unable to defend against Peter if the accounts were frozen. R0097100972. Erica would prove at trial that Peter had been given over $500,000 in advances.
R00973. The trial court stated it did not know if Peter had received his share at that point,

ordering the Wells Fargo and the Chase account be seized. Id. The trial court stated as
follows:
So what I'm going to order is that we seize the Wells Fargo and the
Chase account. The other ones you've said are your personal money. We're
leaving those alone. We will not be seizing those, just the ones that have the
money that was your mothers and the proceeds from the sale of the house.
I'm also going to ask that we - that you submit an order about these
things, just Wells Fargo and Chase. Mountain America, American United, T.
Rowe Price are her money that she's either earned or that her mother gave her
before her death. I'm not seizing the things that he was given before her
death, so I'm not seizing the things that you were given before her death
either.
R00999-01000. The trial court also froze both storage units. Id.

B. September 10, 2015, OSC Hearing.
The district court had read Ms. Lang's objection and noted the hearing was set for a
Ex Parte TROs, but the clerk's email indicated the hearing was for an OSC. R01010. The
district court had set a very short hearing to simply set the TROs for hearing. R01009. The
district court noted Ms. Lang's objection; however, Peter's counsel stated they were present
on the OSC. R01010-01011.
Peter argued no requirement existed in the UTAH RULES OF PROCEDURE, particularly
Rule 4, that an OSC provide a certain amount of notice to the opposing party to appear and
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defend. R01011. Peter argued Erica was served electronically, proper pursuant to D'Aston v.
D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah App. 1990). Id. Peter argued service of an OSC on Erica's

attorney was sufficient since she was represented in an ongoing case. Id. Peter argued Erica
had sufficient notice of the hearing one day prior, and had not appeared. Id.
Counsel objected to the OSC repeatedly stating that the contents of the OSC could
not be addressed without preparation. R01012. Peter argued Erica was prepared because
counsel filed her objection. R01013. Peter argued urgency on the OSC because " ... now
we're missing another $200,000 out of the Oregon bank." R01013.
Erica's counsel argued the hearing was to continue the OSC. R01014. Peter requested
the case move forward on the OSC despite Erica's request for 14 days to prepare to defend
against it. R01014. The district court moved forward on the OSC. R01015. Erica's counsel
continuously argued Erica was not prepared since she was not currently living in Utah, and
was provided insufficient and unreasonable notice of only 24 hours to defend against it.
R0t 015- 01018, 01021. Upon the court's denial of continuance, Erica's counsel refused to
participate in the hearing and departed the courtroom.

In Erica and her counsel's absence, Peter requested one month for a hearing on the
Bench Warrant because it would take time to serve her out of state. R01030-01031. The
district court indicated it held the hearing quickly based on the disappearance of the funds
from the accounts. R01031.
After signing the Bench Warrant and setting bail in the amount of $210,000, Peter
asked an was granted the ability to address additional "tangential" matters never noticed to
Erica or her counsel and outside their presence to defend against them. R01033. Counsel for
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Peter had incurred fees in bringing the OSC, but did not provide any accounting for those
fees, nonetheless requesting the remaining $11,000 in the Chase Bank Trust account be
awarded to him for present and ongoing legal expenses and to hire a forensic expert
R01033-01034. The district court granted this request without requiring any accounting of
fees or expendirures.
Without any notification to Erica or her counsel and in their absence, Peter's counsel
further sought access to the storage units alluding to the idea that Erica may have tampered
with their contents. R0l 034. Peter argued the storage units were interrelated to the OSC and
asked for access, although one of the units contained Erica's personal property. R0103401035. The district court granted this request, indicating it sounded like an appropriate
investigation to support Peter's case. R0l 035. The district court further released the Chase
Bank account funds for the payment of Peter's unproven attorney's fees. Id.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Certain minimal procedural protections in OSC proceedings are guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Khan v. Khan, 921 P.2d 466,468 (Utah App.
1996). A defendant charged with indirect contempt must be advised of the allegations,
provided assistance of counse~ be able to confront witnesses, and have the right to offer
testimony on their behalf. Id. The OSC herein did not provide Erica adequate notice serving
only her counsel electronically 24 hours prior to the hearing, depriving Erica of the ability to
have effective assistance in defending the OSC, the ability to confront the witnesses, or the
right to offer testimony. UT. CONST. ART. I § 7. It was unreasonable to expect Erica to
personally appear on less than 24 hours' notice when she resides and is employed in Oregon.
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Her attorney requested a reasonable continuance of 14 days; however, Peter relied on the
absence of procedural rules governing OSCs in arguing Erica received sufficient notice to
seek the Bench Warrant for her arrest on failure to appear.
Besides holding Erica in contempt and issuing an arrest warrant for Erica to be
incarcerated for two (2) months awaiting a hearing, Erica was subjected to seizure of her
personal storage units for Peter's inspection, and an excessive award to Peter for attorney
fees from the Trust funds ($11,000) for not only the OSC matters, but also future fees and
expenses to support Peter in challenging Erica's position and decisions as trustee of the
Trust. No evidentiary or legal support for such an award exists in the record, but the district
court's actions effectively hampered Erica's ability to defend the Trust and her own actions
by freezing all of the Trust funds and Erica's personal accounts.
All of this has been accomplished in favor of Peter, who extorted an excessive
amount of funds from his parents' accounts under abuse of power of attorney to the extent
that Gwendolyn specifically directed that at least $210,000 be deducted from his one-half
inheritance, that Peter not be allowed to have access to any of the accounts, and providing
authority to Erica to make determinations without court intervention. Yet, the trial court
ignored the decedent's express wishes, has frozen an excessive amount of over $471,000 (to
which Peter is entitled to very little, if any) in personal assets of Erica, has ordered reversal
of all of Erica's decisions as trustee over the Trust under temporary orders without sufficient
proof, and has provided Peter funding for his side of the case in contravention to
Gwendolyn's desires, while depriving Erica of access to any funding for hers although
Erica's position protects the Trust and Gwendolyn's wishes. The harshest order found Erica
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in contempt on all claims raised by Peter and ordered her to be incarcerated until hearing on
November 5, nearly two (2) months later, unless she paid $210,000 after her bank accounts
have been seized and frozen. Summarily, the September 10 hearing violated Erica's right to
Due Process in every respect and any resulting orders therefrom require reversal.
Similarly, due to this ambiguity existing in Utah law respecting OSCs, this Court
should adopt the rules in Fifth and Sixth District Courts that govern them. There are no

rules nor codified Utah law that mandates timely notice of OSCs, despite that freedoms
respecting liberty and property are often at stake in those proceedings. In reliance upon the
absence of such governing rules, Peter argued Erica received proper notice of 24 hours, with
no personal service outside the State of Utah, and the district court felt it had authority to
hear the OSC. This procedural ambiguity violates litigants' rights to Due Process requiring
adoption of provisions similar to the Fifth and Sixth District Courts for OSC proceedings,
to wit personal service of the motion, OSC, and notice of hearing upon the opposing party
similar to the service of a summons and complaint, and a hearing not held sooner than five
(5) days from the date of service. See, UT.JUD. ADMIN. R. 10-1-501(4); -602(4).
Moreover, the entire OSC proceedings were based on the Preliminary Injunction,
which itself was erroneous and contradicted the prior oral determination, rendering it
unenforceable prior to its entry in the docket. "[D]isobedience of any lawful judgment, order
or process of the court" is an act or omission that constitutes contempt of court. UT.AH
CODE .ANN. § 78B-6-301(1)(5). Proof of contempt must show the person knew what was
required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so. Von Hake v.

Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah, 1988). The oral determination for the Preliminary
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Injunction did not clearly indicate to Erica what was prohibited of her by failing to include
specific account numbers to be seized and where the court indicated it did not intend to
seize her personal accounts or funds; thus, Peter could not enforce it against her in contempt
proceedings.
Importantly, the district court has seized far more than that which Peter has pleaded
for or is entitled. Peter has alleged he is entitled to equal disbursement from the Trust estate,
which must be offset by at least $210,000 pursuant to the Instructions. Peter has not
challenged the viability of Gwendolyn's Instructions. However, the district court ordered
Erica's bail to be cash only for $210,000, awarded Peter $11,000 for the payment of legal
fees, and another approximately $260,000 has been seized and deposited with the Oregon
Court. This far exceeds Peter's maximum entitlement to the Trust estate as it has presently
been valued in temporary proceedings. The only asset in the estate at the time of
Gwendolyn's death was the house, which sales proceeds were $550,000, entitling Peter to a
maximum amount of approximately $65,000 ($550,000 divided by two, minus $210,000);
however, from the total wire transfer of approximately $471,000 being traced by these
proceedings (which included funds transferred prior to Gwendolyn's death and Erica's
personal funds from sale of her condo and other sources), Peter's maximum amount hovers
around $25,000 by simple calculation. As Erica testified, however, she can show that Peter's
offsets far exceed the $210,000 articulated by Gwendolyn's Instructions, nullifying Peter's
entitlement to any funds from the Trust. The district court's actions were an abuse of
discretion in temporary proceedings and its findings of contempt therefrom in seizing all of
Erica's personal assets far exceed the maximum amount Peter could obtain, subjecting Erica
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to a lengthy incarceration under oral orders that were contradicted in written form, and
awarding Trust funds to Peter for unproven attorney's fees. Accordingly, the Judgment and

any other adverse order as a result of the September 10 hearing should be reversed.

ARGUMENT
I.

ERICA

WAS

DEPRIVED

OF

INSUFFICIENT NOTICE OF
SEPTEMBER 10, 2015.

DUE PROCESS DUE TO THE
THE OSC HEARING HELD ON

"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law." UTAH CONST. ART. 1, § 7. The United States Supreme Court has long defined "due
process of law" as " ... a conformity with natural and inherent principles of justice, and forbid
that one man's property, or right to property, shall be taken for the benefit of another ...
without compensation, and that no one shall be condemned in his person or property
without an opportunity of being heard in his own defense." Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366,
387, 18 S.Ct. 383, 390-391, 42 L.Ed. 780 (1898). The Utah Supreme Court has held that,
"[t]he minimum requirements [of Due Process] are adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard in a meaningful manner." Dairy Produ,t Services, In,: v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, iJ 49,
13 P .3d 851 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
''Due process is flexible and calls for the procedural protections that the given
situation demands." State v. Tm-azas, 2014 UT App. 229,

iJ

17, 336 P.3d 594 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). 'What constitutes due process, however, depends upon
... 'the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, ... [and]
the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose.'" State v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, iJ
11, 127 P.3d 1213 (alteration in original)(quoting Bearden v. Geo'l,ia, 461 U.S. 660, 666-67, 103
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S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983)). "If a defendant has an 'opportunity to present evidence
and argument on [an] issue before decision,' then he has had an opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful way." Te,razas at iJ 17.
An OSC is an order from the court directed to a defendant to show cause why they
should not be held in contempt for willful disobedience of a court's prior order, with the
burden on a defendant to present evidence regarding the three contempt elements. Coleman
v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 1156-1157 (Utah 1983) (per curiam). In Gardiner v. York, this
Court indicated that, "[f]or the accused contemnor facing a jail sentence, his liberty is
valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ibid.,
2010 UT App 108, ,r 46, 233 P.3d 500, dting Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 500, 94 S.Ct. 2697,
41 L.Ed.2d 897 (197 4) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
194, 208, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968) (procedural protections are fundamental to
our system of justice, and respect for judges and courts are not entitled to more
considerations than these interests of the individual). Thus, "[t]o satisfy an essential requisite
of procedural due process, a hearing must be prefaced by timely notice which adequately
informs the parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet." In re Cannatella, 2006
UT App. 89, ,r 3, 132 P.3d 684 (citation omitted).
In Cooke v. U.S., Cooke wrote a letter to the judge presiding over a trial involving
Cooke's client. Ibid., 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 391, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925). Cooke requested
the judge recuse himself. Id. Eleven days later, the judge issued an attachment and ordered
Cooke and his client to appear and show cause why they should not be punished for
contempt. Id., 45 S.Ct. at 391. Cooke appeared, only receiving notice of the attachment that
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morning, requesting time to prepare and present witnesses for their defense. Id. The judge
refused the continuance, finding Cooke in contempt. Id. However, the Court recognized the
matter was one of indirect contempt outside the courtroom, analyzing it as follows:
When the contempt is not in open court, however, there is no such right or
reason in dispensing with the necessity of charges and the opportunity of the
accused to present his defense by witnesses and argument. The exact form of
the procedure in the prosecution of such contempts is not important. The
court, in RandaJJ v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 540 (19 L. Ed. 285), in speaking of
what was necessary in proceedings against an attorney at law for malpractice,
said:

'.All that is requisite to their validity is that, when not taken for matters
occurring in open court, in the presence of the judges, notice should be
given to the attorney of the charges made and opportunity afforded
him for explanation and defence. The manner in which the proceeding
shall be conducted, so that it be without oppression or unfairness, is a
matter of judicial regulation.'
Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that
committed in open court, requires that the accused should be advised of the
charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or
explanation. We think this includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, and
the right to call witnesses to give testimony, relevant either to the issue of
complete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense and in mitigation of the
penalty to be imposed.
Id., 264 U.S. at 534, 536-537, 45 S.Ct at 394-395 (citations omitted). Cooke found the

proceeding to not be conducted under these principles, faulting the lower court for refusing
to allow defendant to consult counsel, prepare his defense and call witnesses. Id., 264 U.S. at
537, 45 S.Ct. at 397. The lower court believed the evidence foreclosed argument; however,
the Supreme Court found that "the intention with which acts of contempt have been
committed must necessarily and properly have an important bearing on the degree of guilt
and the penalty which should be imposed ... " Id. It found that "the court cannot exclude
evidence in mitigation. It is a proper part of the defense." Id. The Supreme Court
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determined that, although the court had not provided Cooke the change to call witnesses or
make a full statement, it made findings nonetheless about Cooke's perceived actions towards
contempt. Id. The lower court had considered the facts in aggravation of the contempt, while
providing no opportunity to the contemnors to meet or explain them before the sentence.

Id. The Supreme Court found that "the procedure pursued was unfair and oppressive to the
petitioner." Id. Although it noted the authority and dignity of the court in its power of
contempt, it warned that "care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions." Id.,
264 U.S. at 538-539, 45 S.Ct. at 395-396. The matter was accordingly reversed. Id., 264 U.S.
at 540, 45 S.Ct. at 396.
On September 2, 2015, Peter moved for the Ex Parte TROs, alleging Erica violated
the written Preliminary Injunction. R00428-00435. The district court granted the Ex Parte
Motion; however, they were blank as to any hearing date and never became permanent
restraining orders. R00439-00440; 00450-00451. The hearing was apparently docketed for
September 10, 2015 (see, R00492); however, it became a hearing on Peter's OSC. See,
R00468; R00458. Peter's motion for OSC alleged Erica's contempt of the June 25 TRO,
requested attorney fees for the OSC, and requested sanctions against Erica and an order
compelling Erica to identify the location of the funds. R00460-00462.
Peter moved for OSC on September 8, 2015, with the OSC entered on September 9
for a hearing on September 10, 2015. R00460-00461; R00456. Erica was required to appear
in under 24 hours to defend allegations deprive her of liberty and property. Erica resides in
Oregon and could not personally attend.
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Confusion was apparent at the September 10, 2015, hearing, with the court believing
it was there to set the 1ROs for hearing, Erica's counsel objecting to it being an OSC
hearing, and Peter requesting to move forward on the OSC. R01009-01011. Peter argued
Erica was served electronically through counsel, meeting UT. R. CIV. P. 4 and allowing a
hearing on less than five (5) days' notice. R01011-01013. Peter argued urgency based on
Erica's withdrawal; however, the OSC was not sought on an emergency or expedited basis

and was based on actions for which he had notice several months earlier by Erica's court
filing. R01013. The court heard the OSC and denied continuance. R01015. Erica's counsel
thereafter refused to participate and departed. Peter requested a month for hearing on the
Bench Warrant for Erica's arrest, stating it would take time to serve her. R01030-01031. The
court cited disappearance of funds as reason for expediting the hearing. R01031; R01010.
The court signed the Bench Warrant and set bail at $210,000. Peter asked and was
granted the ability to address other matters not noticed. R01033. Peter requested and was
granted the $11,000 remaining in the Trust Chase Bank account for his unproven attorney
fees incurred in the OSC, to hire a forensic accountant, and for Peter's ongoing legal
expenses. R01033-01034. Peter was granted access to Erica's personal storage unit and
another with estate assets contrary to the Preliminary Injunction. R01034. Peter
acknowledged he had not noticed Erica on the matter, but argued it was sufficiently
interrelated to the OSC. R01034-01035.
Erica has been deprived of liberty and property without Due Process. UT.AH CONST.
.ART. 1, § 7. Erica's property has been taken for Peter's benefit, who does not aver or

maintain a claim to the amount seized, and without providing her a reasonable opportunity
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to be heard. Holden, 169 U.S. at 387, 18 S.Ct., 390-391. Due Process demands fairness, which
was not granted to Erica. Dairy Produd at ,I 49; Te"azas at ,It 7. Erica was required to receive,
at minimum, adequate notice of the OSC and the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
manner. Id. This is clear not only from the record, but also Utah law.
The Ex Parte TROs noticed no hearing. The OSC noticed September 10th ; however,
there was confusion whether the hearing was for the OSC or the Ex Parte TROs. The
district court thought it was a TRO scheduling hearing; however, Peter requested the OSC
be heard and the court agreed. It then became an evidentiary or determinative hearing
respecting Erica's rights. Such transformation did not give Erica meaningful time to prepare
her defense and present evidence to controvert Peter's contempt claims. Coleman at 11561157. The OSC thus failed to meet the minimum requirements of Due Process. Gardiner at ,I
45.
The court and Peter failed to afford Erica orderly process to present vital information
in mitigation of the indirect contempt claims. Id. at ,I 46. The egregious result of this
deprivation was a warrant for Erica's arrest, bail set at $210,000.00-although the district
court had already frozen all of Erica's accounts providing Peter with double (or more)
redress-seizure of the contents of the Trust Chase Bank account for Peter's legal fees, and
access to Erica's personal property in storage. Accordingly, Erica's valuable liberty and
property were not given due consideration depriving Erica of the meaningful ability to
appear and defend herself. Id. Erica has been subjected to serious criminal and civil
punishment without fundamental Due Process. Cannatella at if3.
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This matter is akin to Cooke, 267 U.S. 517,

45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925).

Whether Erica actually engaged in contemptuous conduct is inapplicable to whether she was
afforded Due Process for indirect contempt. Erica maintained the right to reasonable
opportunity to present her defense by witnesses and argument, but was deprived due to
Peter's insufficient notice. Id., 267 U.S. at 536-537, 45 S.Ct. at 395. The September 10
hearing was therefore oppressive and unfair. Id.
Erica's right to call witnesses to give testunony relevant to either the issue of

complete exculpation or in mitigation of the penalty imposed was not afforded to her. Id.
The manner in which this case was conducted violated Due Process. Id. The district court
detennined to move forward on the OSC on urgency of disappearing funds-a transfer of
which it was aware months earlier by Erica's own notice informing the parties and court;
nonetheless, the court refused Erica the ability to meaningfully consult counsel, prepare her
defense, and call witnesses. Id., 264 U.S. at 537, 45 S.Ct. at 397.
Similar to Cooke, the court proceeded on the theory that the disappearance of funds
foreclosed evidence or argument. Id., 264 U.S. at 538-539, 45 S.Ct. at 395-396. Gwendolyn's
stated intent was for Erica to administer her estate without judicial interference further
requiring the court to hear evidence in mitigation or exculpation of Erica's actions. Id.
Erica's Clarification alerted the parties of possible ambiguity in the district court's oral
pronouncement and informed them of the withdrawal; however, the Preliminary Injunction
then altered that oral pronouncement significantly. Erica had a viable defense to Peter's
contempt allegations. See, id. The court's decision only considered Peter's aggravating facts
for contempt, granting unproven and speculative attorney fees, costs, and the seizure of the
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storage units that had never been noticed. Id. No opportunity was given to Erica to present
mitigating evidence, particularly against Peter's unnoticed "tangential" claims, resulting in an
unfair and oppressive procedure prejudicing Erica's rights. Id. The court mistakenly favored
its power, authority and dignity in contempt proceedings over Erica's fundamental rights.
The court intended to vindicate itself in issuing its severe orders, but no Due Process
was afforded to Erica to defend herself. Peter used the Ex Parte TROs, although never
finalized, to cause Community Bank to interplead and deposit the entire contents of Erica's
personal bank accounts with the Oregon court. By requiring $210,000 cash only bail, the
court would receive the remainder of the $472,199.33 originally in Erica's personal bank
accounts in June of 2015. Peter has been afforded every remedy requested based on the
erroneous Preliminary Injunction, argued more particularly post. The lack of Due Process
afforded to Erica requires the reversal of the Judgment and the other erroneous orders
entered as a result of the district court finding Erica in contempt.
The hearing was not scheduled in a manner that would give Erica sufficient time in order
to do defend her positions against Peter's allegations and unaverred requests. See, Cannatella
at ,I3. Due to this lack of procedural protection, Erica's right to Due Process has been
violated and her ability to defend herself against Peter's claims on September 10 was not
afforded to her. Accordingly, the orders resulting from the September 10 hearing should be
reversed.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS
ORDERED WITHOUT NOTICE, LACKED EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT,
AND CONSTITUTES AN EXCESSIVE AWARD.
Respecting damages to the aggrieved party in a contempt proceeding, Utah law states

as follows:
If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or special proceeding is caused

by the contempt, the court, in lieu of or in addition to the fine or
imprisonment imposed for the contempt, may order the person proceeded
against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify and
satisfy the aggrieved party's costs and expenses. The court may order that any
bail posted by the person proceeded against be used to satisfy all or part of the
money ordered to be paid to the aggrieved party. The order and the
acceptance of money under it is a bar to an action by the aggrieved party for
the loss and injury.
UTAH CODE .ANN. §78B-6-311(1). ".Any actual loss suffered by the party aggrieved may be

recovered if caused by the party through his contemptuous acts." Foreman v. Foreman, 176
P.2d 144, 150 (Utah 1946) .
.Applicable rules state as follows concerning attorney fees:
(a) When attorney fees are authorized by contract or by law, a request for
attorney fees shall be supported by affidavit or testimony ...
(b) An affidavit supporting a request for or augmentation of attorney fees shall
set forth:
(b) (1) the basis for the award;
(b)(2) a reasonably detailed description of the time spent and work performed,
including for each item of work the name, position (such as attorney,
paralegal, administrative assistant, etc.) and hourly rate of the persons who
performed the work;
(b)(3) factors showing the reasonableness of the fees;
(b)(4) the amount of attorney fees previously awarded; ...

UT. R. Crv. P. 73(a)&(b). This Court has held as follows concerning attorney fee affidavits:
An adequate affidavit will generally answer four questions:
1. What legal work was actually performed?
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2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately
prosecute the matter?
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in
the locality for similar services?
4. Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors,
including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?

EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanojf, 2008 UT App. 284, ,I 17, 192 P.3d 296, citing Dixie State
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988) (footnotes omitted).
In the matter of Holladay Towne Center, ILC v. Brown Fami!J Holdings, LC, this Court
determined that, "[a]lthough the Browns' affidavit generally listed a number of services
provided by their attorneys and identified each attorney's hourly rate, there was no
breakdown as to which attorney performed which services, the hours spent on each service,
or even the total number of hours expended on the litigation." Ibid., 2008 UT App. 420,

,r

21, 198 P.3d 990. This Court accordingly reversed the order determining the amount of the
fee and cost award due to this failure. Id.
"Thus, a court's authority to impose an award of fees as a sanction against a party
who has been obstructive or contemptuous is derived from several statutes and common law
doctrines." Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ,r 36, 299 P.3d 1079. ''But none of those statutes or
doctrines permit the amount of the award to exceed the amount of fees, costs, or injury that
the other party actuaJly incurred." Id. (emphasis added). "Specifically, the amount of fees
and costs awarded under the Contempt Statute cannot exceed the amount of 'actual loss or
injury' suffered by the other party." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[w]e have held that '[w]hile the standard for
determining the amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for proving the fact of
damages, there still must be evidence that rises above speculation and provides a reasonable,
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even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages."' TruGreen Companies, LLC v.

Mower Brothers, In,:, 2008 UT 81, ,i 15, 199 P.3d 929, dting Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain
States Tel & Tel Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985). "ci>laintiff, of course, has the burden to

produce a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish the fact of damages and to pennit the trier
of fact to determine with reasonable certainty the amount of lost ... profits."' Id. citing Sa1J()lerS
v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986).
During the September 10 hearing, Peter's counsel asked to address "tangential"
matters, which the district court agreed to hear absent notice to Erica and her counsel
R01033. Peter requested release of the $11,000 remaining in the Chase Bank Trust account
for his attorney fees in the OSC and for ongoing legal expenses. R01033-1034. The court
stated attorney fees was "not going to end." R01035. It entered the Order to &lease Funds,
ordering Chase Bank to release $11,000 directly to Peter's counsel for Peter's legal fees.
R00486-00487.
Peter never presented an affidavit of legal fees or otherwise justified his expenses.

Truman at 1f31. This violated Erica's Due Process rights absent notice and an opportunity to
be heard, but additionally infringed on Erica's ongoing position as trustee of the Trust
account from which the funds were removed. No order has ever removed Erica as trustee,
even temporarily, and Gwendolyn's Instructions give her exclusive authority over the Trust
without judicial interference. Without adequate notice, Erica was unable to object to the
award as unreasonable and unjustified. Further, it was unconscionable to award Peter
present or future attorney fees when the statute governing such an award is limited to actual
damages in bringing the OSC. UT. R. Crv. P. 73(a)&(b).
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Peter was limited to his actual loss or injury caused by Erica's alleged contempt.
UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-311(1). However, Peter did not present an accounting, but

instead requested and was given a blank check for his current and ongoing legal expenses,
which far exceeds any actual loss suffered by Peter. 1:oreman at 150. No evidence of his

actual loss or damage was ever presented as required by UT. R. CIV. P. 73(a). Peter
presented no reasonably detailed description of the time spent and work performed, the
hourly rates, or factors evidencing reasonableness. UT. R. CIV. P. 73(b). Peter presented no
evidence as to (1) the legal work actually performed; (2) whether it was reasonably necessary
to prosecute; (3) whether the billing rate was consistent with customary rates; or (4) whether
circumstances that required consideration of additional factors. EDSA at if17.
In cases where a party fails to properly specify or justify the fees, this Court has
reversed the award. See, Holladay at if21. While the district court may have had the authority
to award Peter fees, it was not permitted to award excessive fees or costs outside finding
actual injury Peter incurred in bringing the OSC. Goggin at if36. The speculative award of
$11,000 for Peter's current and ongoing and future legal expenses and to hire an expert
witness is therefore in clear violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-311(1), UT. R. CIV. P.
73(b), and controlling caselaw. See, TruGreen at if15. Peter wholly failed to produce a
sufficient evidentiary basis to establish entitlement to this award. Id. As a result, the award of
$11,000 is unreasonable pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-6-311(1) and unjustified in the
record pursuant to UT. R. CIV. P. 73(b).
The attorney fees award was unreasonable and unjustified, insufficiently noticed for
hearing, legally insufficient as granted absent contract or controlling legal provision (UT. R.
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Crv. P. 73(a)), and unsupported by the evidence. The Order to &lease Funds should therefore
be reversed.

III.

UTAH LAW IS AMBIGUOUS AS TO THE PROCEDURE OF OSC
PROCEEDINGS.
'When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the

court or judge, an affidavit or statement of the facts by a judicial officer shall be presented to
VP

the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt." UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6302(2). "If the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court

or judge, a warrant of attachment may be issued to bring the person charged to answer."
UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-303.
UT. R. Crv. P. S(a)(1) states as follows regarding pleadings that must be served in an

action:
(a)(1) Papers that must be served. Except as otherwise provided in these rules
or as otherwise directed by the court, the following papers must be served on
every party:
(a)(1)(.A) a judgment;
(a)(1)(B) an order that states it must be served;
(a)(1)(C) a pleading after the original complaint;
(a)(1)(D) a paper relating to disclosure or discovery;
(a)(l)(E) a paper filed with the court other than a motion that may be
heard ex parte; and
(a)(l)(F) a written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, or
similar paper.

"If a party is represented by an attorney, a paper served under this rule must be served upon
the attorney unless the court orders service upon the party." UT. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(1). "If a
hearing is scheduled 7 days or less from the date of service, a party must serve a paper
related to the hearing by the method most likely to be promptly received." UT. R. CIV. P.
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5(b)(2). "Otherwise, a paper that is filed with the court must be served before or on the same
day that it is filed." Id.
"A nonmoving party may file a memorandum opposing the motion within 14 days
after the motion is filed." UT. R. CIV. P. 7(d)(1). However, other than the procedure for
family law contained in UT. R. CIV. P. 101(b), these motions for OSC are usually submitted
ex parte and the claimed contemnor responds instead to the court on the OSC issued on
such motion rather than in the time frame dictated in Rule 7(d)(l).
In Fifth and Sixth District Court, a motion for an OSC, supporting papers, and
notice of hearing must be personally served just as a summons and a complaint would be
served and the hearing may not be held sooner than five (5) days from the date of service,
unless irreparable injury and other circumstances exist to expedite the hearing. UT.

JUD.

ADMIN. R. 10-1-501(4) and -602(4). Additionally, that initial hearing will determine whether

a full evidentiary hearing is necessary. UT. JUD. ADMIN. R. 10-1-501(3)(F) and -602(3)(F).
This case originates from Third District Court, which does not have local rules set out in the
judicial administration rules governing motions for an OSC specific to its district.
Peter filed the OSC Motion after the clerk set the September 10th hearing on the
OSC. R00458; 00460-00465. The OSC entered September 9, 2015, at 3:54 p.m. R00468. Ms.
Lang filed an Objection, requesting a continuance in order to prepare Erica's defense to the
OSC. R00473-00474. When the hearing commenced, the court noted the hearing was to set
the TRO; however, the clerk's email noticed it for OSC. R01010. Relying on the absence of
set rules governing OSCs, Peter argued there was no requirement that a person be given any
specific amount of notice on an OSC prior to the hearing. R01011. Peter argued Erica was
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properly served electronically pursuant to D'Aston v. D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah App.
1990). Id. Peter argued service on a party's attorney for an OSC is sufficient if they are
represented. Id. Thus, Peter argued Erica had notice of the hearing and did not appear. Id.
Ms. Lang argued the hearing was to continue the OSC since it could not be argued on
such short notice. R01012-14. Peter argued Erica was properly noticed enough to file for
continuance, and the OSC needed to be heard because $200,000 was missing. R01013.
R01014. Peter requested the court deny continuance and move forward on the OSC, which
it did. R01014-15. Ms. Lang stated Erica was not prepared to defend on 24 hours notice, and
Erica was not in Utah to be able to attend. R01015- 01018, 01021. The court nonetheless
found Erica in contempt and issued a bench warrant for her arrest with $210,000 set for bail.
Utah law is ambiguous on procedure for service and notice of OSC proceedings, with
Peter's counsel conceding it was "one of those ambiguous things" in the Rules (similar to
supplemental orders). R01028. Erica argued that, since there are no specific Third District
Court rules governing service or notice of the Motion for OSC, OSC and notice of hearing,
Peter took advantage of the absence of such rules in obtaining a full evidentiary hearing on
the OSC on less than 24 hours' notice, depriving Erica of Due Process as argued more
thoroughly supra.
Pursuant to Rule 5, the Motion for OSC and OSC were required to be served upon
Erica, which was served on Ms. Lang via the electronic filing system. UT. R. CIV. P.
5(a)(l)&(b)(l). Further, the method of service to Ms. Lang was promptly received; however,
there was insufficient time for Erica to personally appear or prepare any defense at all in the

35 of 48

time allotted, which is presumably why Fifth and Sixth District have formulated their own
set of rules governing OSCs. UT. R. CIV. P. S(b)(2).
The court expedited the hearing because money was disappearing quickly; however,
Erica was fully transparent to the parties and court in the Clarification months earlier, even
attempting to clarify the oral decision by providing the account numbers for her personal
accounts versus the Trust accounts. Erica indicated she had withdrawn from her Chase Bank
account, noting that the court had only orally ordered seizure of the Trust account and not
her personal accounts. Only on entry of the Preliminary Injunction in the docket in July did
Erica's personal accounts become seized. Erica had a viable defense as to Peter's allegations
of contempt on September 10; however, the procedure in obtaining the OSC in this case
prevented her from presenting that defense in the form of witnesses, evidence, and
argument.
There is an uncodified standard of practice of service and notice for OSCs among
Utah attorneys. Most abide the process created by the Fifth and Sixth District Courts in
either requesting opposing attorneys accept service or having a party served personally
pursuant to Rule 4, particularly since OSCs are contempt proceedings and thus, freedoms
respecting liberty and property are at stake. Further, evidence in mitigation on contempt
allegations is usually maintained by the person, not the attorney, leaving an attorney without
the ability to confer with the client and defend the facts on too little notice.
The first hearing on an OSC is generally used to determine whether a full evidentiary
hearing is needed and to allow the parties to negotiate a settlement to resolve the motion.
However, Peter and the court held the evidentiary hearing at this first hearing without
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allowing Erica to properly prepare a defense, providing less than 24 hours' notice of the
allegations against her.
While Peter cited to D~ston v. D½ton, 790 P.2d 590, 592 (Utah App. 1990) as
grounds that service was proper through Ms. Lang, this is a family law case implicating UT.
R. Crv. P. 101; however, such rule does not apply to the cuttent type of civil proceedings.

Regardless, Peter's counsel used the absence of specific OSC procedure to obtain expedited
and detrimental orders against Erica in violation of her Due Process rights.
This Court should adopt the procedure articulated by the Fifth and Sixth District

Courts and require that an OSC, with its accompanying pleadings, be served pursuant to
Rule 4, unless the opposing attorney accepts service. The hearing should not be sooner than
five (5) days from the date of service. Further, the first hearing should detennine whether an
evidentiary hearing is warranted. UT. JUD. ADMIN. R. 10-1-501, -602. This Court should
reverse the lower court's orders as departing from standard practice when it choose to move
forward on the OSC on to little notice and depriving Erica of her meaningful opportunity to
be heard, thereby violating Erica's Due Process rights. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; UT.
CONST...ART. 1, § 7.

IV.

PETER OBTAINED EXCESSIVE RELIEF WHEN THE DISTRICT
COURT ORDERED $210,000 IN CASH ONLY BAIL, WHICH FAR
EXCEEDS PETER'S MAXIMUM ENTITLEMENT AS AN EQUITABLE
HEIR TO GWENDOLYN'S ESTATE.
The election of remedies doctrine is to prevent double redress for a single wrong.

McK.eon v. Crump, 2002 UT App. 258, ,I 12, 53 P.3d 494 dting Palmer v. Ht9es, 892 P.2d 1059,
1061-1062 (Utah App.1995). Utah law states as follows:
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If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or special proceeding is caused
by the contempt, the court, in lieu of or in addition to the fine or
imprisonment imposed for the contempt, may order the person proceeded
against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify and
satisfy the aggrieved party's costs and expenses. The court may order that any
bail posted by the person proceeded against be used to satisfy all or part of the
money ordered to be paid to the aggrieved party. The order and the
acceptance of money under it is a bar to an action by the aggrieved party for
the loss and injury.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-311(1). "Any actual loss suffered by the party aggrieved may be

recovered if caused by the party through his contemptuous acts." J?oreman v. Foreman, 176
P.2d 144, 150 (Utah 1946).
In his Complaint, Peter alleged he was entitled to Trust assets as an equal beneficiary to
Erica. R00002. Gwendolyn's Instructions dictated Peter's inheritance required a minimum of
$210,000 offset for money he had already extorted previously. Erica testified the home sold
for approximately $550,000, which was the only asset in the Trust. R00872-00873; 00877.
On July 7, 2015, the district court entered the Preliminary Injunction, seizing the contents of
the Wells Fargo and Chase Bank accounts titled in either Erica's name or the Trust. R0036300366.
At the September 10, 2015, hearing, Peter requested a bench warrant for Erica for
failing to personally appear, which was granted. R01028-01029. For cash bail, Peter
proposed $210,000.00, to which the district court stated, "[s]ounds to me like that's an
amount maybe [Erica] could post." R01029. This was the amount claimed to be "missing"
from Erica's personal accounts seized in Oregon. Peter asked for and was granted the
$11,000 remaining in the Trust account for payment of his attorney fees, to hire a forensic
expert and for Peter's ongoing attorney fees in prosecuting his action against the Trust and
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Erica. R01033-4. The district court granted the request because it found attorney fees were
"not going to end.'' R01035.
The court has afforded Peter excessive relief where he is likely not entitled to relief at
all, but definitively far less than the amount seized from Erica's financial accounts and the

bail amount of $210,000. Peter has alleged only that he is an equal heir to Gwendolyn's
estate; however, his equitable share is offset by $210,000 pursuant to Gwendolyn's
Instructions. Erica testified the home was the only asset and sold for $550,000. See, R00877.
Thus, without deducting Erica and Tim's pay for caring for Gwendolyn and other fees/costs
of the estate, Peter's half of $550,000 would equal $275,000. When Gwendolyn's required
offset of $210,000 is applied, Peter is entitled to a maximum of $65,000, but likely much
less than this sum given the other obligations of the Trust prior to calculation and
distribution of inheritance.
Accordingly, seizing over $260,000 from Erica's personal accounts and setting Erica's
contempt bail at an additional $210,000 far exceeds Peter's maximum entitlement as an heir
to Gwendolyn's estate pursuant to her Instructions. This process provides Peter more than
double redress for the amount subject to his inheritance-Peter's actual loss or injury from
the actions he alleged against Erica. McKeon at

,r

12. Peter has thus far obtained relief in

excess of his Complaint, through duplicate avenues of relief. Id. The trial court has seized an
amount--or set bail to recompense the amounts-totaling over seven Cl) times the absolute
maximum that Peter can obtain in the bare calculations contained in Gwedolyn's
Instructions, and has done so under temporary orders.
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This was done without evidence of "actual loss or injury" to Peter. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-6-311(1). The amount seized through the Oregon courts under the expired
TRO never made permanent significantly covered the maximum amount Peter could obtain
as his inheritance. The Utah court then provided double (or more) redress by ordering a bail
amount presumed to tty and seize all of the funds transferred by Erica, regardless if they
were personal funds, those from the sale of her condo, or those transferred to her by
Gwendolyn prior to her death. Peter never evidenced any "actual loss or injury" particularly
maintaining little to no entitlement to the Trust funds. His actions, improperly sanctioned by
the court below, have left Erica insufficient means to defend the Trust and herself. Peter
could not recover anything other than his own actual losses or injuries with a nexus to the
alleged contemptuous act, and he presented no evidence towards those at the hearing.
Fof'Cman at 150. The court was concerned about money disappearing, but took extreme

measures in temporary orders without looking to see what actual injury or loss was evident.
Its determination was thus erroneous.
The Ex Parte TRO evidenced to the Oregon Bank that there was a dispute between
Erica and Peter of the funds in her account. R00S00-00501. Thus, the Oregon Bank
deposited the funds with the court in Oregon in the amount of $262,199.33, which was the
total amount in Erica's account. R00501. This was sufficient to cover Peter's averred
inheritance even without his offset dictated by Gwendolyn of $210,000; however, the court
then also ordered an excessive bail amount allowing Peter to abuse the system to render
Erica without means to defend the Trust or herse1£ Accordingly, the Judgment must be
reversed.
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V.

THE ELEMENTS OF CONTEMPT ARE NOT PRESENT IN THIS CASE
DUE TO ERRONEOUS PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENTERED
EARLIER IN THIS CASE.
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy; it is the exception rather than

the rule." GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 678 (10 th Cir. 1984)(citation omitted). Further,
"[i]n determining whether a preliminary injunction is warranted, a court must be guided by

normal equitable principles and must weigh the practicalities of the situation." Id. (citations
omitted). As an extraordinary remedy, "it should not be issued unless the movant's right to
relief is 'clear and unequivocal."' Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th
Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It is "'an anticipatory remedy purposed to prevent the

perpetration of a threatened wrong or to compel the cessation of a continuing one."'
Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, ,i 8, 991 P.2d 67 (citation omitted). "Injunctive relief is

fundamentally preventive in nature, and an injunction serves to 'preserve the status quo
pending the outcome of the case."' Zagg, Im,: v. Harmer, 2015 UT App. 52, ,r 8,345 P.3d 1273
(citation omitted).
UT. R. Crv. P. 52(a) states in pertinent part that, " ... in granting or refusing

interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action." A preliminary injunction is
required to make findings regarding the elements of Rule 65A, which are whether irreparable
harm exists, threatened injury outweighs injury to restrained party, the order would be
adverse to public interest, and the applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying
action. UT. R. CIV. P. 65(A)(e).
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In System Concepts, In,: v. Dixon, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed Rule 65A under an
alleged breach of an employment contractual covenant not to compete. Ibid. 669 P.2d 421,
424 (Utah 1983). Therein, the district court denied issuance concluding the preliminary
injunction would prohibit Dixon from any employment in her industry, creating a great
hardship for Dixon. Id. at 429. However, Dixon determined there was no evidence to
support the finding, nor findings to support the conclusion. Id. The Rule 65A standards were
not addressed at all in the findings, and therefore the trial court's judgment was clearly
against the weight of the evidence. Id.
In Matter of Estate v. Quinn, this Court found the absence of findings left the Court
"none to confident" in the trial court's determination to dismiss the estate's original personal
representative for wasting assets on unnecessary legal feels, then award those to the
attorneys who generated them. Ibid., 830 P.2d 282, 290 (Utah App. 1992). Similarly, in the
matter of Powers v. Taylor, a district court made certain oral findings on the record; however,
no written findings were made. Ibid., 378 P.2d 519 (Utah, 1963). When the recitals from the
resulting order were inconsistent with the express declarations by the court, that judgment
was vacated. Id.
"[D]isobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court" is an act or
omission that constitutes contempt. UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-301(1)(5).
As a general rule, in order to prove contempt for failure to comply with a
court order it must be shown that the person cited for contempt knew what
was required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to
do so.... These three elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in
a criminal contempt proceeding, ... , and by clear and convincing evidence in a
civil contempt proceeding....
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Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988)(intemal citations omitted). The

defendant bears the burden of proof on these elements. The movant bears the burden of
these elements to obtain an OSC; however, the defendant bears the burden once an OSC is
issued. Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 1156-1157 (Utah 1983).

In Salt Lake City v. Dormon-Ligh, this Court stated as follows:
For the court to hold one in contempt of an order, that order must be clearly
understood to be an order. To be enforced, an order must be sufficiently
specific and definite as to leave no reasonable basis for doubt regarding its
meaning. . . . Moreover, the order need not be in writing, but it must be
objectively understandable as an order from which sanctions may accrue for
disobedience. Such was not the case here. Therefore, the State could not be
sanctioned for disobeying the Commissioner's request.

Ibid., 912 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah App. 1996)(mtemal citation omitted).
The Preliminary Injunction herein, which contains only orders, was treated as rule
rather than an exception, particularly where no findings or conclusions were rendered
supporting such. GTE Co,p. at 678. The trial court was not correctly guided by equitable
principles in expanding the Preliminary Injunction to include Erica's personal accounts. Id.
The changes from the oral decision and the written Preliminary Injunction failed to weigh
the practicalities of the situation and properly place Erica on notice of what was expected of
her. Id.
The Preliminary Injunction issued in error because Peter's ability to seize Erica's
personal funds was not clear and equivocal. Heideman at 1188. The Preliminary Injunction
exceeded its purpose in only being an anticipatory remedy to prevent a threatened wrong or
to compel the cessation of a continuing one. Hunsaker at ,I 8. The Preliminary Injunction is
fundamentally preventive in nature and is intended to preserve the status quo pending the
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outcome of this case. Zagg at ,I 8. The status quo was not to even temporarily intrude upon
Erica's decisions as trustee, particularly given Gwendolyn's Instructions forbidding court
interference. Instead, the Preliminary Injunction was used to seize funds beyond Peter's
claim to inheritance by wholly ignoring Gwendolyn's estate documents, Instructions, and

Statement.
The district court stated it was unsure on June 25 whether Peter had received his
share from advancements. R00971-00972. It thus did not seize the advancements prior to
Gwendolyn's death. R00999-01000. Thus, Peter received his inheritance by extorting the
funds prior to Gwendolyn's death, but has seized Erica's through temporary proceedings
herein because she did not require payment as trustee, employee or heir prior to
Gwendolyn's death. Erica has acted in good faith and has been transparent, filing the
Clarification indicating she had withdrawn from her personal Chase Bank account based on
her interpretation of the court's oral order-the only order governing her at that time. The
parties were on notice of Erica's withdrawal for two (2) months before Peter moved for

osc.
The Preliminary Injunction constitutes an abuse of the court's discretion because it
was clearly rendered against the weight of the evidence on June 25. Dixon at 425. The district
court's about-face from seizing only accounts with Trust funds on June 25 to seizing all
accounts in Erica's name pursuant to the Preliminary Injunction was arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable. See, e.g., Patijic Frontier v. Pleasant Grove Ci!J, 414 F.3d
1221, 1231 (10 th Cir. 2005).
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The Preliminary Injunction was required to have findings and conclusions on the
grounds for determirung to seize all of Erica's personal financial accounts in an amount in
excess of Peter's claimed inheritance under the estate documents. UT. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
Moreover, the Preliminary Injunction is devoid of addressing any elements required by Rule
65.A. The Preliminary Injunction contains no findings or conclusions at all. See, R0036300364. It only contains orders. See, id. .Accordingly, the Preliminary Injunction herein is
worse than that analyzed in Dixon. Ibid. at 429. The Preliminary Injunction is clearly against
the weight of the evidence presented on June 25, particularly where it seized more than it
orally determined. See, id.
Further, the Preliminary Injunction was clearly ambiguous because the oral decision
seizing Trust accounts found that Peter failed to establish injunctive relief over anything
more than those. Absent detailed findings, it is unclear how the trial court determined to
seize Erica's specific personal financial accounts. Quinn at 290. There is no evidentiary basis
for the trial court's action to exceed its oral pronouncement. Id. The recitals contained in the
Preliminary Injunction are inconsistent with the court's oral ruling and are insufficient,
without more specific evidence to support it, to support the Preliminary Injunction. Powers at
519.

Erica cannot be held in contempt for violating the Preliminary Injunction prior to its
entry when it deviated from the oral pronouncement that governed her actions. She could
not disobey ambiguous orders. UTAH CODE .ANN. § 78B-6-301(1)(5). Peter was required to
demonstrate Erica knew she was not allowed to withdraw from her own personal bank
account, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so. Von Hake at
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1172. Peter was required to prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal
contempt proceeding against Erica when he pursued OSC in September of 2015. Id; see also,

Coleman at 1156-1157. He did not and thus the OSC erroneously issued.
The seizure of Erica's personal bank accounts was not clear at the June 25 hearing,
the oral order under which Erica's actions were taken the next day. Dormon-Ligh at 455.
Accordingly, for Peter to have enforced the Preliminary Injunction against Erica, Peter was
required to have proven Erica was not allowed to touch her personal accounts on June 26,
which he cannot do. Id. The seizure of Erica's personal accounts in an order that does not
include specific bank account numbers is not sufficiently specific and definite, leaving a
reasonable basis to doubt the order and its meaning, particularly before it was entered. Id.
The June 17 TRO was finalized by the oral decision rendered on June 25, and later
memorialized in altered form in the written Preliminary Injunction. Erica understood the
oral ruling (see, Clarification) to not affect her personal accounts, even if they were at the
same bank as the Trust accounts; however, this changed upon entry of the Preliminary
Injunction, which entry occurred after she acted on the oral ruling. She cannot be held in
contempt of the written decision when it had not been entered, particularly where the oral
decision differed as to seizing her personal accounts. Id. Erica cannot be sanctioned for
failure to comply with the Preliminary Injunction on actions preceding its entry. Id.
Moreover, Gwendolyn's estate documents, Instructions, and Statement have been
ignored by the district court. Gwendolyn's Instructions dictate Peter's share of inheritance
would be offset by advancements of at least $210,000, but possibly more if Erica discovered
additional "advancements." However, coincidentally this figure is exactly the amount the
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district court ordered as Erica's cash-only bail. All of Erica's financial accounts are frozenincluding her account at MA.CU where the proceeds of the sale of her condo were deposited,
and the funds contained in Oregon Community Bank, which contained personal funds from
her employment-and deposited with the Oregon court. This contradicts Gwendolyn's
express desires that Erica not be required to prove Peter's advancements in court and that
there be no court interference. R00286 .
.Accordingly, Erica has suffered severe prejudice. The district court has clearly acted
in an arbitrary and capricious manner, which constitutes an abuse of discretion. Therefore,
the orders constituting Erica's contempt should be reversed inasmuch as Peter cannot prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Erica knowingly committed contempt of either the oral
decision or the Preliminary Injunction.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, this Court is respectfully requested to
reverse the Judgment and other erroneous interlocutory orders entered by the district court
and remand with appropriate instructions.

~ATED thls~June, 2016.
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Addendum ''A''
Warrant and Order of Commitment filed September 21, 2015

(the "Judgment")
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The Order of Court is stated below:
./ }·~-~ \
Dated: September 21, 2015
Isl KATIil Q~~Sf
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Joshua K. Peterman (Bar No. 10248)
COHNE KINGHORN, P.C.
111 East Broadway, 11 th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 363-4300
Facsimile (801) 363-4378
josh@cohnekinghom.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD .RJDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PETERS. LINKER,
Plaintiff,

WARRANT AND ORDER OF
COMMllMENT
Civil No_ 150902246

V.

ERICA J. LINKER, individually, and as
trustee of the Gwendolyn Linker Trust
Agreement,

Judge: Katie Bernards-Goodman

Defendant_

On Septem her 10, 20 I 5, th is Court entered an Order wherein Defendant Erica J. Linker
was found to be in willful violation of this Court's orders. Based upon this order, it is hereby
ORDERED that Erica J. Linker be and hereby is committed to the Salt Lake County Jail, to
remain there until November 5, 20 I 5 at which time she is to be brought before me at the Third
Judicial District Court, 450 S. State St., Salt Lake City, Utah on November 5, 2015 at 3:00 p.m.
Defendant Erica J. Linker may only be released earlier than this date upon posting of a CASH
ONLY BAIL in the amount ofTwo Hundred and Ten Thousand dollars ($210,000.00).

00524
September 21, 2015 O1:04 PM
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NOW, THEREFORE, I COMMAND YOU, any Peace Officer, or the Sheriff of Salt
Lake County~ or the Sheriff of any County wherein Defendant Erica J. Linker may be found, that
you take the body of said Defendant and safely keep her in close custody in the jail of the abovenamed county until her cash bail is posted or she is brought before me at the aforementioned date

and time. The above sentence is the order of this Court and this shall be sufficient warrant for its
execution.
- Court's Signature and Date Appear at Top of First Page of this Document -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 18th day of September 2015, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order of Commitment was electronically filed with the Court.

which sent notification of such filing to the following:
Marsha M. Lang
Marsha McQuarrie Lang, P.C.
2020 South 1300 East, Suite D
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Isl Joshua K. Peterman
Joshua K. Petennan
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Addendum "B"
Controlling Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. U.S. CONST. §8 states in part that, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."

B. UTAH CONST. .A.RT. I, § 7 states, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."
C. UTAH CONST. ART. 1, § 9 states in part that, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required;
excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be

inflicted."
D. UTAH CODE .ANN. § 78B-6-301(5) states in pertinent part that, "[t]he following acts

or omissions in respect to a court or its proceedings are contempts of the authority of
the court: ... disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court[.]"
E. UTAH CODE .ANN. § 78B-6-302(2) states, "[w]hen the contempt is not committed in
the immediate view and presence of the court or judge, an affidavit or statement of
the facts by a judicial officer shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts
constituting the contempt."

F. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-6-303 states as follows:
If the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the
court or judge, a warrant of attachment may be issued to bring the person
charged to answer. If there is no previous arrest, a warrant of commitment
may, upon notice, or upon an order to show cause, be granted. A warrant of
commitment may not be issued without a previous attachment to answer, or a
notice or order to show cause.

G. UTAH CODE .,ANN. § 78B-6-310 states, "[t]he court shall determine whether the
person proceeded against is guilty of the contempt charged. If the court finds the

person is guilty of the contempt., the court may impose a fine not exceeding $1,000,
order the person incarcerated in the county jail not exceeding 30 days, or both."
H. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-6-311(1) states as follows in pertinent part:

If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or special proceeding is caused
by the contempt, the court, in lieu of or in addition to the fine or
imprisonment imposed for the contempt., may order the person proceeded
against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify and
satisfy the aggrieved party's costs and expenses.

I. UT.AH R. CIV. P. 73(a) states, "[w]hen attorney fees are authorized by contract or by
law, a request for attorney fees shall be supported by affidavit or testimony ... "

